a moral property p does not entail that anyone has beliefs about what exemplifies p, about whether p is exemplified at all, or about the conditions under which p is exemplified. Condition (ii) is meant to express part, but only part, of what many philosophers aim to express by phrases like 'moral properties are not mind-dependent' or 'moral facts are not theory-dependent'. 2 Some naturalists already accept the conclusion that I want to defend here, but many continue to resist it. For reasons that will become clear below, those who resist have typically done so by arguing for one of the following claims:
(C1) Regardless of whether they are reducible to non-moral properties, objective moral properties play an indispensable role in the best causal explanations of at least some natural phenomena (e.g., moral beliefs and judgments, or morally significant behavior).
(C2) Moral properties are reducib le to non-moral properties which, in turn, play an indispensable role in the best causal explanations of various natural phenomena.
Part of what I aim to show is that, contrary to widespread opinion, neither of these claims offers any promising line of resistance against the conclusion I'll be defending.
My argument will come in two parts. The first part aims to show that any plausible and naturalistically acceptable argument in favor of belief in objective moral properties will appeal in part to simplicity considerations (broadly construed)-and this regardless of whether moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties. By 'simplicity considerations (broadly construed)' I mean just those considerations that reflect our preference, ceteris paribus, for theories that are elegant, ontologically economical, mathematically simple, and consistent with our considered judgments, theoretical commitments, and other entrenched background presuppositions.
3 (Such considerations are often referred to as 'pragmatic' considerations; but I avoid that label because I do not want to presuppose that they are merely pragmatic and thus not indicative of truth.) Henceforth, I will speak of an appeal to such considerations just as an "appeal to simplicity".
The second part argues for the conclusion that appeals to simplicity justify belief in moral properties only if either those properties are not objective or something like theism is true. Thus, if my argument is sound, naturalists can reasonably accept moral realism only if they are prepared to accept something like theism. But, as will become clear, naturalists can reasonably accept theism or something like it only if belief in some such doctrine is justified by the methods of science. For present purposes, I'll assume (what I think virtually every naturalist will grant) that belief in theism and relevantly similar doctrines is not justified by the methods of science.
Thus, I will conclude that naturalists cannot reasonably accept moral realism. Before presenting the details of the argument, however, I'll first say a few words about the nature of naturalism.
Naturalism
As I understand it, naturalism is not a view, or a philosophical thesis, but a research program. A research program is a set of methodological dispositions-dispositions to trust particular cognitive faculties as sources of evidence and to treat particular kinds of experiences and arguments as evidence. Naturalism, so I say, is a research program that treats the methods of science, and those methods alone, as basic sources of evidence (where a putative source of evidence is treated as basic just in case it is trusted in the absence of evidence in favor of its reliability).
In characterizing naturalism this way, I put myself at odds with many philosophersnaturalists and non-naturalists alike. But the philosophers with whom I am at odds are not at all unified in their views about what naturalism is. Some say that naturalism is primarily a metaphysical view (for example, the view that the universe is a closed causal system). 4 Others say that it is primarily an epistemological view (for example, the view that scientific inquiry is the only avenue to knowledge). 5 Still others say that it is primarily a view about philosophical methodology (for example, the view that philosophers ought to abandon traditional problems about skepticism and ontology and pursue their various projects in a way continuous with the methods of science). 6 Most naturalists would affirm Wilfrid Sellars's slogan that "science is the measure of all things: of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not" (Sellars 1963: 173) ; and many, no doubt, would say that this slogan captures the heart and soul of naturalism. But apart from that, there is little agreement about what, precisely, naturalism amounts to.
It is tempting, in light of the proliferation of different and conflicting formulations of naturalism, to say that naturalism comes in different varieties, each expressible by a different philosophical thesis. Those who give in to this temptation typically list three varietiesmetaphysical, epistemological, and methodological-though once in a while other varieties are identified. 7 Different philosophers are then labeled not simply as naturalists but as metaphysical, 3 For further, more detailed discussion of simplicity as I am understanding it here, see Koons 2000 , Swinburne 2001 , and Weinberg 1994 (Ch. 6) . 4 See, e.g., Armstrong 1980: 35 and Danto 1967: 448. 5 See, e.g., Quine 1995: 257 and Devitt 1998: 45. 6 See, e.g., Leiter 1998: 81. 7 Indeed, giving into this temptation is now the standard way of characterizing naturalism. See, e.g., Schmitt 1995 , Hampton 1998 : 19 -21, and Katz 1998 epis temological, or methodological naturalists, depending on which of the relevant theses they seem to endorse.
But this is not the only way of accounting for the diversity of formulations of naturalism.
Another possibility is that there is indeed only one version of naturalism, but many mischaracterizations of it. Given the current state of the literature, to embrace this possibility is to say that many naturalists have mischaracterized their own naturalism. Saying this might seem uncharitable. It might also seem implausible. Nevertheless, I think that there are very good reasons for doing so.
Despite all the disagreement about how to formulate naturalism, almost every naturalist agrees that naturalism somehow involves deep respect for the methods of science above all other forms of inquiry. To the extent that one fails to manifest a disposition to follow science wherever it leads, one fails to count as a naturalist. But if we take this idea seriously, then we are led fairly directly to the conclusion that naturalism couldn't be a substantive philosophical thesis. For naturalists will agree that any substantive thesis that we might plausibly identify with naturalism is itself at the mercy of science. That is, any such thesis must be justified by the methods of science, if at all; and any such thesis can, at least in principle, be overthrown by scientific investigation. But no one seems to think that naturalism itself would be refuted if science were to produce evidence against some favored thesis of (e.g.) metaphysics, epistemology, methodology, or semantics. Again, the heart of naturalism is to follow science wherever it leads; but, clearly enough, one cannot be a naturalist and be disposed to follow science wherever it leads if naturalism itself is inextricably tied to some thesis that science might overthrow. To suppose that naturalism involves dogmatic adherence to a substantive philosophical thesis is, therefore, either to suppose that naturalists one and all have fallen into a rather elementary and uninteresting sort of incoherence or to suppose that, appearances to the contrary, naturalists are not really unified by a disposition to follow science wherever it leads. But neither of these alternatives seems what is common to virtually all of those who call themselves naturalists without falling prey to the problem (briefly described above) that besets any attempt to express naturalism as a thesis.
As I see it, then, what unifies naturalists is not adherence to a philosophical position, but rather a disposition to conduct inquiry in a certain way-a way dominated by the methods of science.
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What are the methods of science? Notoriously, it is hard to say exactly what they are.
But we can say very roughly that the methods of science are, at present anyway, those methods (including canons of good argument, criteria for theory choice, and the like) that are regularly employed and respected in contemporary university science departments (e.g., departments of biology, chemistry, geology, physics, etc.). Reliance on memory and testimony is surely included among these methods, as are judgments about apparent mathematical, logical, and conceptual truths. Ruled out, on the other hand, are evidential appeals to ungrounded hunches, rational intuitions (conscious episodes in which a proposition seems to be necessarily true), putative divine revelations or religious experiences, manifestly unreliable sources of testimony, and the like. 9 Again, this characterization is rough; but it will do well enough for present purposes.
Science and Morality
In light of the characterization of naturalism just given, it should be clear that a naturalistically respectable argument for any conclusion will be one that appeals only to premises that can be known by way of the methods of science. In this section, I will argue that any naturalistically respectable argument for belief in objective moral properties will have to appeal to simplicity.
I'll take as my point of departure Gilbert Harman's well-known argument for the general conclusion that moral realism is untenable. In short, Harman rejects moral realism on the grounds that objective moral facts have no role to play in our best causal explanations of natural phenomena. In response to his argument, those interested in defending both naturalism and moral realism have typically defended either C1 or C2:
(C2) Moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties which, in turn, play an indispens able role in the best causal explanations of various natural phenomena.
Indeed, as I'll make clear below, there seems to be no naturalistically respectable way of resisting Harman's argument apart from defending C1 or C2. But I'll also argue that, if this is right, then even if C1 or C2 can be successfully defended, any naturalistic argument for belief in objective moral properties will have to make some appeal to simplicity.
Harman's Argument
In the opening chapters of The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman argues that ethics is problematic because it appears that "there can be no explanatory chain between moral principles and particular observings in the way that there can be such a chain between scientific principles and particular observings." (1977: 9) The "particular observings" for which moral facts are candidate explanations are just moral observations. For example, Harman points out that if we see some young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, we do not need to conclude that their behavior is wrong; we can see that it is an instance of wrong behavior just as clearly as we can see that it is an instance of cat-burning behavior. (1977: 4) But, he argues, moral facts have no role to play in explaining this sort of observation. More exactly: they have no role to play in the best causal explanation of this sort of observation (or of anything else). As he makes clear elsewhere (Harman 1984: 33 -4; Harman 1986: 61 -4 ) the point isn't that moral facts are never invoked in an explanatory way. The point, rather, is that the fact that the behavior of the catburning hoodlums is wrong, the fact that the hoodlums are depraved, and other such moral facts seem not to figure in any causal explanations of anything. Thus, Harman can grant that it makes perfect sense to say (e.g.) that we are repulsed by the behavior of the cat-burning hoodlums because the behavior is wrong, and that the children are behaving in that way because they are depraved. The point is just that the wrongness of their behavior does not cause our observation that the behavior is wrong, nor does it cause our repulsion at that behavior; and the depravity of their character does not cause the hoodlums to burn the cat. Boyd (1982 Boyd ( , 1988 concedes what will be crucial for my point later on-namely, that by employing the method of reflective equilibrium as a method of theory choice, we inevitably choose theories in part on the basis of simplicity considerations. 13 This fact is all that I aim to establish by assuming with
Harman that scientific justification proceeds by way of inference to the best exp lanation. 14 But it is, I think, a fact that will be as easily established under any other plausible assumption (like Boyd's) about the process of scientific justification that purports to be compatible with scientific realism.
Granting P3 and P4, the only way to resist Harman's argument is to endorse either C1 or C2. As it happens, I think that both C1 and C2 are false; but in the remainder of this section my main concern will simply be to show that, even if one or the other is true, naturalistic arguments in support of moral realism must ultimately rest on an appeal to simplicity.
Inference to the Best Explanation
According to C1, objective moral properties play an indispensable role in the best causal explanations of at least some natural phenomena, and this regardless of whether they are reducible to non-moral properties. Plausible examples in support of C1 are hard to find; but three seem especially worthy of attention. First, one might note that we often regard the moral judgment of others as being more or less reliable than our own. But, one might think, one's moral judgment can be reliable only if the presence or absence of moral properties at least partly causally explains one's moral beliefs. (Sturgeon 1986: 71-2; Adams 1999: 67-8 propositions and properties do enter into causal explanations, but that is only because they play an indispensable role in the sorts of causal explanations that constitute our best physical theories.
It is emphatically not because they must be invoked as causes either of mathematical beliefs or of insomnia. As Harman points out, however, moral propositions do not enter into physical theory, or any other scientific theory, in the way that mathematical propositions do. And I think that there is no more reason to think that they must be (or even can be) invoked as causes of moral beliefs or morally significant behavior than there is to think that mathematical properties or propositions can be invoked as causes of mathematical beliefs or of insomnia. Of course, if
Sayre-McCord is right in thinking that there are at least some regularities in the world that are "unidentifiable and inexplicable" apart from an appeal to moral properties, then there is reason to think that moral properties enter into our best causal explanations of natural phenomena. But I see no naturalistically acceptable reason for thinking that Sayre-McCord's claim is true.
Consider his first example: honesty's engendering trust. The clear, empirically detectable regularity here is a connection between a certain kind of truth-telling disposition and various other dispositions to believe and act on the things that are said by people with the first disposition. But why think that this regularity can't be identified or explained apart from an appeal to moral properties? Similar remarks apply to the other examples on Sayre-McCord's list.
I needn't press this point, however. For, as I will now argue, there's good reason to think that, regardless of whether C1 is true, any scientific justification we might have for belief in objective moral properties will depend on an appeal to simplicity. As Section 3 will make clear, this is all that is required to show that naturalists cannot accommodate belief in objective moral
properties.
Suppose, as we have been, that scientific justification proceeds by way of inference to the best explanation. There are, very roughly speaking, two ways in which we can be justified by an inference to the best explanation in believing that properties of a certain kind are exemplified.
The properties in question might be among the explainers, explicitly posited as salient causes of particular empirical phenomena. Or their existence might be implied by background presuppositions which are part of the theory because of their simplifying role (i.e., their presence in the theory helps to make it more elegant, more ontologically economical, less mathematically complicated, or more consistent with our considered judgments, theoretical commitments, or other entrenched presuppositions). I do not mean to suggest that there is any sharp distinction to be drawn between explanatory posits and background assumptions. But there is at least an intuitive, rough-and-ready distinction here that is worth attending to. So, for example, if belief in the fundamental, causally efficacious properties of protons is justified by an inference to the best explanation, it is so because those properties are posited by our best explanations of various empirical phenomena as causes of those phenomena. On the other hand, if belief in the kindproperty being a proton is justified by an inference to the best explanation, it probably is so not because that property too is posited as a cause of various empirical phenomena, but rather because our theories are simplified by framing them in terms of an ontology that includes protons rather than, say, in terms of an ontology that includes only mere bundles of the more fundamental properties, or aggregates of instantaneous proton-stages, or something else empirically but not metaphysically equivalent. I say this because, plausibly, there is nothing that would be causally explained by the property being a proton that isn't already causally explained by the more fundamental, intrinsic, non-sortal properties of protons. Likewise, I think, with properties like being a material object, being an enduring particular, and being an intrinsic modal property. Such properties are either causally inert or causally redundant. Thus, whatever scientific justification we have for believing in them would seem to come from the simplifying role they play in our theories, since whatever causally explanatory roles they might be thought to play are either spurious or else already being played by other, more fundamental properties. Now, it is hard to take seriously the idea that moral properties are explanatory posits.
That is, it is hard to take seriously the thought that our main reason for believing in moral properties is that our best scientific theories posit them as the salient explanatory causes of particular empirical phenomena. As we have seen, some do claim that moral properties are causally efficacious and that they play a role in our best explanations of natural phenomena. But no naturalist seems seriously to think that the explanations in question invoke moral properties to explain phenomena that are otherwise causally unexplained. To whatever extent moral properties are causally efficacious at all, from a naturalistic point of view they are either reducible to nonmoral properties or else irreducible but causally redundant. In either case, all of the relevant explanatory work is already done by non-moral properties. Thus, there is no need to posit distinctively moral properties for explanatory purposes. So if belief in moral properties is justified by an inference to the best explanation, this must be because our theories are somehow simplified by framing them in terms of an ontology that includes moral properties rather in terms of one that doesn't.
Further evidence for this comes from the fact that none of the major defenders of the explanatory value of moral properties attempts to defend the claim that moral properties are explanatory posits. Nicholas Sturgeon (1985 Sturgeon ( , 1986 , for example, makes it his strategy to assume that there are moral properties and then to show that, on that assumption, such properties have a role to play in our explanations of various phenomena. Thus, rather than attempt to show that moral properties must be posited to explain various phenomena, he only aims to show that explanatory roles can be found for moral properties if we take for granted (presumably for other reasons) that there are such properties. Boyd (1988) , Jackson (1998) , Jackson & Pettit (1995) , Railton (1986), and Sayre-McCord (1988b) among others all take similar strategies. And this is precisely the strategy we should expect to find naturalistic proponents of C1 taking if, as I have argued, whatever scientific justification we have for belief in moral properties comes from the simplifying role of such belief.
There is another reason for thinking that if belief in moral properties is justified by an inference to the best explanation then it is justified in part on pragmatic grounds. properties is justified by an inference to the best explanation, it's justification depends ultimately upon an appeal to simplicity.
The Irrelevance of Reducibility
According to C2, moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties that figure in our best causal explanations of natural phenomena. I take it that, in the context of the moral realism debate, the project of reducing moral properties to non-moral properties is just the rather broad project of trying to show how moral properties might be identical with or in some sense composed of properties that are quantified over in paradigmatically scientific theories. (Thus, there is no reason to suppose that a reduction would ha ve to provide "bridge principles"
explicitly identifying specific properties mentioned in existing moral theories with specific properties mentioned in existing physical, chemical, or biological theories.) In the remainder of this section, I will argue that even if objective moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties, naturalists still must appeal to simplicity in order to justify belief in such properties. If I am right, then establishing the reducibility of moral properties to non-moral properties is of no use to a naturalist hoping to resist the overall conclusion of this paper.
The basic problem is just this: Demonstrating reducibility is not the same as realism. This is a conclusion that I am inclined to agree with, but adding to Koons's defense is not my purpose here. want were he to step into A's shoes." (174-5) Thus, Railton's view rightly yields the judgment that it is objectively non-morally good for the dehydrated man to drink water even though he actually wants to drink milk; and, plausibly, these facts about the man's non-moral good supervene on purely descriptive, non-normative facts.
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From here, the account of moral rightness unfolds roughly as follows. Moral rightness is understood as rationality from a social point of view; rationality is understood as the pursuit of what it is in one's objective interests to do; and so social rationality is understood as pursuit of whatever is in the objective interests of society. Furthermore, the objective interests of society are characterized in a way analogous to the characterization of the objective interests of an individual: again, roughly, those interests are whatever would be approved of by an impartial observer under conditions of ideal information. Of course, one's own objective interests might not coincide with society's; but, Railton says, facts about social rationality can still ground ought claims that apply to individuals because the social point of view "includes but is not exhausted by" the individual's. (1986: 201) Moreover, these ought claims will satisfy the two conditions I identified as necessary for objectivity since they are, in the relevant sense, theory-independent.
We may note in passing that, even if Railton's account thus far is true, it is not at all clear that it implies that moral facts are genuinely reducible to non-moral facts. 17 The reason is that it
is not clear what non-moral facts are supposed to determine the desire structure of the hypothetical observer; hence, it is not clear what facts determine the relevant hypothetical 16 Railton's account of an agent's non-moral good is similar to the account of normative reasons offered in Smith 1994. Smith, however, does not take himself to be offering a fully reductive analysis of normative reasons. As he himself points out, normative concepts are employed in spelling out what it means for S to have a normative reason to ϕ. (162) 17 For the record, I do not believe that Railton's account thus far is true. The most compelling problem is that his account is unable to accommodate the fact that it might be in a person's objective interest to desire something but not to have it. Suppose it is a fact about Kevin that if he were to desire to go to medical school, he would embark upon a course of action that would very probably not result in his actually going to medical school but would result in his achieving something else that is very satisfying for himself (perhaps a career as a science teacher or some such thing). Suppose furthermore that if he were actually to go to medical school, he would be absolutely miserable. We may assume that Kevin himself does not know these facts, but that Kevin+ would know them. What then would Kevin+ desire to desire were he in the actual condition and circumstance of Kevin? Pretty obviously, he would desire to desire to go to medical school. But according to Railton's account, it does not follow from this that desiring reactions of approval and disapproval. In the case of an individual agent, Railton invites us to suppose that the desire structure of the agent's idealized self depends importantly upon the agent's actual desire structure. And we can see how the dependence would go: take that initial desire structure, and then suppose that it remains generally intact in the agent's idealized self except for whatever modifications would be induced by improving the agent's cognitive abilities and information base in the ways suggested. One might reasonably doubt that there are any facts about what modifications would be induced in an agent's desire structure by making the requisite cognitive improvements. 18 But even if there are such facts, the point is that in the case of social rationality, a story analogous to this one about how the hypothetical observer's desire structure is to be determined seems impossible to tell. We might suppose that the hypothetical observer's desire structure would depend in some way upon the actual goals and desires of individual agents; but it is not at all clear how the dependence would go.
Let us leave this worry aside, however, and let us simply concede that Railton's account has shown us how moral facts might be reducible to non-moral facts. Still, Railton's account crucially depends on the assumption that one in some sense ought to act in accord with social rationality and that one ought to do what it is in one's objective interest (as defined by Railton) to do. Granted, we can see why, given a certain set of interests and desires, it would be attractive or efficient or useful to act in these ways, and that various tangible benefits would be produced by so acting. But Railton's reduction of non-moral goodness and moral rightness does not justify the claim that one objectively ought to pursue one's non-moral good and that one objectively ought to go to medical school is in Kevin's objective interest, which is true; rather, it follows that going to medical school is in Kevin's objective interest, which is false. 18 As Mark Murphy (1999: 261-265) argues, there is also reas on to doubt (a) whether such modifications would all count as improvements in the agent's desire structure, and (b) whether there's any good reason to think that the hypothetical second-order desires of an agent's cognitively idealized self are any more authoritative with respect to the agent's well-being than the agent's actual second-order desires.
to do what is morally right. (1) If there are objective moral properties, and if theory T of the nature of morality, rationality, and related notions is correct, then moral properties are identical with or composed of natural properties N 1 -N n .
(2) Our uses of words that allegedly refer to moral properties reliably track N 1 -N n .
Perhaps some interesting conclusions follow from these premises. But clearly the conclusion that there are objective moral properties does not follow from the premises. 20 Thus, even if C2 is true, and even if it can be shown that a particular reduction has correctly identified natural properties tracked by our moral terms, there is still work for a naturalist to do in showing how belief in objective moral properties could be justified by the methods of science. And, for precisely the reasons laid out in section 2.2, it seems that the only plausible stories to be told here are ones according to which belief in moral properties depends for its justification on considerations of theoretical simplicity.
Pragmatic Arguments
In Section 2, I argued that any naturalistically respectable argument for belief in objective moral properties will have to appeal to simplicity. In this section, I'll argue that appeals to simplicity justify belief in moral properties only if moral properties are not objective or something like theism is true.
Some philosophers make a distinction between pragmatic and epistemic justification. The distinction between the two parallels the distinction between pragmatic and epistemic rationality-i.e., the distinction between what is rational to do given the goal of furthering one's overall best interests and what is rational to believe in light of one's evidence given the goal of believing in accord with the truth. It is epistemic justification that we're interested in here. And the initially pressing question is whether an argument that invokes considerations of simplicity as reasons for belief can provide epistemic justification for its conclusion.
For reasons I won't get into here, I'm inclined to think that one is automatically epistemically justified in believing things that are sanctioned by sources of evidence that one treats as basic. 21 Insofar as naturalists treat the methods of science as basic sources of evidence, and insofar as simplicity considerations are (apparently, anyway) routinely invoked as reasons for belief in the natural sciences, I am prepared to assume for the sake of argument that naturalists are epistemically justified in believing propositions that are supported by appeals to simplicity (especially those that figure in inferences to the best explanation or the method of reflective equilibrium). If this assumption is false, then my ultimate conclusion follows directly:
naturalists are not epistemically justified in believing propositions supported (only) by arguments that appeal to simplicity; from a naturalistic point of view, belief in objective moral properties is sanctioned (if at all) only by arguments that appeal to simplicity; therefore, naturalists cannot reasonably accept commonsense moral realism. 22 Thus, the initially pressing question-whether one can be epistemically justified in believing something partly on the basis of an appeal to simplicity-is resolved by stipulation.
But once the stipulation is granted, we are committed to thinking that there is some connection between simplicity and truth. The reason is that arguments appealing to simplicity can yield epistemic justification only if believing propositions on the basis of such arguments is a reliable way of believing in accord with the truth. 23 Let us suppose, then, that simplicity is somehow a reliable indicator of truth. The pressing question now is: What would be the best explanation for this fact?
One interesting suggestion that I'll set aside is that our preference for simplicity is just a disguised preference for truth. According to Richard Boyd (1980 , 1985 , for example, what often get described as considerations of simplicity are really nothing more than manifestations of a 21 I defend this claim in Chapter 1 of Rea 2002. 22 I assume that one can reasonably accept only what one is epistemically justified in believing. But this is just a terminological point-a point about how I am here proposing to use the word 'reasonably'. 23 Or so I assume. But I acknowledge that the assumption is controversial.
preference for theories that are relatively "simple" modifications of existing, evidentially supported theories. Thus, given that our existing theories are at least approximately true, the preference for simplicity turns out, on this view, to be little more than a preference for (approximate) truth.
There is a lot that is worth exploring in this view, but for now I'll simply observe that adopting it leaves the naturalist no better off with respect to belief in objective moral properties than I have so far taken her to be. Suppose we grant that "existing moral theory" (whatever exactly that would be) is approximately true. The fact is, this might be so whether or not there are objective moral properties, and whether or not existing moral theory quantifies over objective moral properties. Now, if Boyd's understanding of simplicity is correct, then one who believes in objective moral properties on the basis of such considerations believes in them either because so doing represents a simple modification of an existing theory, or because their existence is already implied by an existing theory. In light of the arguments of Section 2, it is hard to see what reason a naturalist could ever have for modifying an existing theory so that it quantifies over objective moral properties. An appeal to simplicity is ruled out because, on Boyd's view, that's not a reason for modifying a theory; it's a reason for preferring one modification rather than another.
But the point of Section 2 was to show that, from a naturalistic point of view, there aren't any (evidential) considerations apart from simplicity that would lead one to posit objective moral properties. Thus, if Boyd's understand ing of simplicity is right, then if existing moral theory quantifies over objective moral properties, it does so for no reason at all, or it does so simply because existing moral theory has always quantified over such properties. Thus, if his view is right, it looks as if a naturalist's belief in objective moral properties is either ungrounded or grounded simply in the fact that such belief is and always has been prescribed by existing moral theories. But even if we grant that believing something simply because you (or others) always have believed it is a reliable way of reaching the truth, nothing in Boyd's view explains why this should be a reliable way of reaching the truth. It's easy to see how a preference for existing theories can reliably lead us to approximate truth, given that those existing theories are already approximately true. But it doesn't help us to see how a preference for existing theories in general can lead us to the truth about specific parts of a theory-such as the proposition that there are objective moral properties. Thus, it remains a mystery how believing a specific proposition simply because you and others have always believed it should be a reliable way of reaching the truth. And I take it that the answers to this question will roughly parallel the answers to the more general question at issue here-namely, the question of what would explain the fact that simplicity considerations as I understand them are generally truth-indicative.
So what would explain the fact that simplicity is truth-indicative? One possibility is that someone or something in the universe is somehow benevolently guaranteeing that it will be. This, clearly enough, is in the neighborhood of theism. Another possibility is that a pragmatic theory of truth is correct: truth is, roughly, acceptability or assertibility under ideal conditions, where "ideal conditions" are spelled out partly in terms of simplicity considerations. A third possibility, constructivism, is that we make it the case that our theories are true by conceptualizing the world in whatever way we do. 24 Thus, so long as we conceptualize the world in a way that is empirically adequate (as our scientific theories aim to do) there is no real question whether the ontological commitments we thereby incur will be true. 25 On this view, simplicity isn't really an indicator of truth (truth is guaranteed by empirical adequacy); rather, it is just a constraint that happen to govern our theorizing.
It is hard to imagine (plausible) explanations other than these for why simplicity would be a reliable indicator of truth. 26 Of course, one can't infer much from a mere failure of imagination. But if, upon reflection, we simply can't see why theoretical virtues that we take to be truth-indicative should be truth-indicative, it is hard to see how we can be justified in continuing to treat them as truth-indicative. Thus, assuming it is non-negotiable for naturalists to continue treating simplicity as a reliable indicator of truth, and assuming that they (like me) have no other plausible story to tell about why it ought to be a reliable indicator of truth, it seems that the only reasonable option is to embrace one of the above three alternatives. As a theist, I am sympathetic to the first. Moreover, the second (as I shall argue) implies something very much like theism. Thus, on the assumption that the methods of science do not by themselves justify belief in God, or even something very much like God, naturalists are committed to the third alternative. In what follows, I'll first explain why accepting constructivism commits one to the conclusion that moral properties are not objective. I'll then go on to argue that pragmatic theories of truth imply something very much like theism.
To see why constructivism requires us to give up the objectivity of moral properties, we must first get a clearer grasp on what the position amounts to. At first blush, it might seem to be incoherent. It is, after all, rather hard to see how we could accomplish the creative feats that about truth. For more on constructivism, see Chapter 1 of Rea 2002. For detailed arguments for the conclusion that constructivism does not imply a pragmatic theory of truth, see Alston 1996, Ch. 6. 26 Koons (2000) discusses a suggestion by David Papineau and Ruth Millikan to the effect that perhaps evolutionary processes have "taught" us that there is a correlation between (e.g.) simplicity and truth. Weinberg (1994) constructivism seems to require. How could we make it the case that there are stars, or planets, or human organisms simply by theorizing about the world in a way that quantifies over stars, planets, and human organisms? More pressingly, how could we-by using our minds-make it the case that there are minds? These are serious questions; but I think that constructivists can provide answers, and a brief look at those answers will help to clarify the position as I understand it.
The second question can be treated quickly. As I see it, constructivists must simply deny that we make it the case that there are minds; thus, they must deny that minds are part of the material world that is constructed by our theories. 27 If this is right, then constructivists are committed to substance dualism. This is surely an interesting (and probably generally unwelcome) consequence; but it is not a refutation, and embracing it enables the constructivist to avoid the charge of incoherence.
The first question is more complicated. In response to it, I think that constructivists should articulate what many take to be a Kantian view of the world. Roughly, that view is as follows. None of the properties that appear to be sortal properties of non-abstract, non-mental objects are intrinsic to anything. Properties like being an electron, being a horse, being a star, being a human organism, and so on are all extrinsic. Notoriously, it is hard to say exactly how such properties could be extrinsic. The most intelligible versions of constructivism typically make it clear that the reason they are extrinsic is that whether they are exemplified depends importantly upon relations obtaining between our minds and the mind-independent world (i.e., whatever thing or things of a wholly unidentifiable sort exist independently of our minds).
28
27 I defend this conclusion in detail in Chapter 7 of Rea 2002. 28 The thing or things belonging to the world as it is in itself must be of an unidentifiable sort because the constructivist's thesis is that all of the sortal properties we are familiar with are extrinsic; but if the thing(s) Moreover, they make it clear that those relations involve, at least in part, our conceiving of the world in the ways that we do. But beyond this, it is hard to say exactly what the relevant relations consist in.
Be that as it may, some analogies may help to clarify the position a bit further. Consider some other properties that are often, even if not universally, regarded as "being in the eye of the beholder": properties like being a work of art, or being a thing of great beauty. The constructivist might say that, just as the matter in a region of spacetime counts as a work of art or a thing of great beauty only if we (or the members of some relevant group) think of it as a work of art or a thing of great beauty, so too whether the matter in a region of spacetime counts as a star, or a planet, or a human organism, depends upon our thinking of it as a star, or planet, or human organism. Likewise, she might say, just as there would be no art, or nothing beautiful, if
we regarded nothing as art or as beautiful, so too there would be no stars if we regarded nothing as a star. There would, of course, still be the stuff that causes our star-like sensations. That stuff is part of the mind-independent world. 29 But apart from our belief-forming activities, that stuff would not constitute a star.
Even with these analogies on hand, we are still a far cry from having answered all of the questions one might have about the intelligibility of constructivism. But we at least have enough of a picture to see clearly why moral constructivism is incompatible with commonsense moral realism. Quite simply, constructivism implies that goodness, like beauty or art, is in the eye of the beholder. Admittedly, matters will probably be a bit more complicated than this.
Constructivism is, for example, compatible with the view that what's good is what the members belonging to the world in itself is (are) to be truly mind-independent, it (they) must have its (their) sortal properties intrinsically.
of some salient majority take to be good, or what our most pragmatically virtuous theories identify as good. But regardless of the details, any constructivist theory will, by its very nature, make facts about goodness dependent upon our beliefs about goodness. Thus, a constructivist account of goodness will not be an account according to which goodness is a theory-independent property; hence, it will not be an account according to which goodness is an objective property;
hence, it will be incompatible with commonsense moral realism.
All that remains, then, is to deliver on my claim that pragmatic theories of truth imply something like theism. I have defended this conclusio n at length elsewhere (Rea 2000 , Rea 2002 , so for present purposes I will only provide a brief sketch.
My argument draws its inspiration from Alvin Plantinga's 1982 Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association. In that address, Plantinga argues that a thesis about truth which he attributes to Hilary Putnam implies that, necessarily, there exists an ideally rational community. The Putnamian thesis about truth is as follows:
(HP) Necessarily: p is true ≡ if there were an Ideally Rational Scientific Community (IRS) that had all of the relevant evidence, it would accept p.
In short, Plantinga points out that, by substitution, we can easily obtain HP1:
(HP1) Necessarily: it is true that there is an IRS ≡ if there were an IRS that had all of the relevant evidence, it would accept that there is an IRS.
But, of course, it is eminently plausible that an IRS possessed of "all the relevant evidence"
would accept the conclusion that there is an IRS. Thus, HP1 implies the "dismal conclusion" (W) Were P to be appraised under (constructively specified) sufficiently good epistemic conditions, P would be true if and only if P would be believed.
(Wright 2000: 350)
As Crispin Wright points out, conditionals like W serve to constrain the notion of truth in the ways that pragmatists typically want; and, importantly, they do not suffer from many of the problems that plague ordinary ETE's. But, though W-style conditionals surely say something interesting and important about truth, they are not theories of truth. A genuine theory of truth will offer or imply, at the very least, a necessary equivalence of the form 'Necessarily, p is true ≡ _____'. And, again, it is hard to see how any such equivalence could constitute a pragmatic theory of truth without being or entailing an ETE.
The second premise in the argument is that every ETE implies something like theism. To establish this conclusion, I need two assumptions. The first is that it is possible that there are no contingent beings. The second is as follows:
(SC) For any true ETE: Let C be its acceptance condition and let α be the following proposition:
(α) There exists a rational community S such that, for every proposition p, S satisfies C for either p or the denial of p.
Then: Necessarily, if there is a rational community that satisfies C with respect to α, then α is true.
The first assumption isn't wholly uncontroversial; but I assume it will be granted by most naturalists. After all, naturalism typically (though not necessarily) goes hand-in-hand with atheism, and atheists are typically prepared to admit that there might have been nothing at all.
Regarding SC, the idea is roughly just that only a being ideally situated with respect to every proposition would be in an ideal position to evaluate a proposition like α. A less-than-ideally situated being (e.g., a being very much like one of us) might have less-than-ideal evidence for either α or its denial. But having ideal evidence in favor of α would guarantee it's truth (since ideal evidence must be infallible), and having ideal evidence against α seems to be impossible (since, plausibly, only a being ideally situated with respect to every proposition could infallibly rule out the truth of something like α).
Given these two assumptions, the second premise can be defended as follows. Let EC below be any true ETE (if such there be); let C be EC's acceptance condition; let α, β, and γ be propositions as follows:
(α) There exists a rational community S such that, for every proposition p, S satisfies C with respect to either p or its denial.
(β)
Τhere exists a rational community that satisfies C with respect to α.
(γ)
Τhere exists a rational community that both satisfies C with respect to α and accepts α.
We then have:
(EC) Necessarily: p is true ≡ if there were a rational community that satisfied condition C with respect to p, then there would be a rational community that both satisfies condition C with respect to p and accepts p. (Premise) (6.1) Necessarily: α is true ≡ if β were the case then γ would be the case. 6.1 and 6.2 together entail 6.3 on the assumption that the correct modal system is S4 or stronger and that the correct semantics for counterfactuals guarantees that (i) a counterfactual conditional implies its corresponding material conditional, and (ii) a strict conditional implies its corresponding counterfactual conditional. 30 But from 6.3, it is a short step to the conclusion that, necessarily, there exists an omniscient community. 6.3 implies that it is necessarily true that there exists a rational community S such that, for every proposition p, S satisfies C with respect to either p or its denial. But this in conjunction with EC implies that it is necessarily true that, for every true proposition p*, there is a rational community that both satisfies C with respect to p* and accepts p*. Hence, it follows that, necessarily, there is a rational community that accepts a proposition that tells the whole truth about whatever world is actual. 31 Thus, necessarily, there exists an omniscient community. Moreover, if one is willing to grant that the correct modal system is S5, then 6.3 implies that there exists a necessarily existing rational community. Again, 6.3 implies that it is necessarily true that there exists a rational community; but, on the assumption that it is possible that there be no contingently existing beings, it follows that there is a possible world w that contains a rational community but no contingently existing rational beings. Thus, w must contain a necessarily existing rational community. But this implies that there in fact exists a necessarily existing rational community.
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If this argument is sound, then pragmatic theories of truth entail that (a) necessarily there exists an omniscient community, and (b) there exists a necessarily existing rational community.
This isn't quite theism, but it is close. Theists, of course, will not be bothered by this conclusion, for their view already entails it and (typically) is motivated by considerations independent of a commitment to an epistemic account of truth. Naturalists, on the other hand, ought simply to reject epistemic accounts of truth; hence, they ought also to reject pragmatic theories of truth.
However, as we have already seen, naturalists who reject a pragmatic theory of truth must either embrace theism or give up belief in objective moral properties. Assuming, as I have been, that belief in God is not justified by the methods of science, the first alternative is unavailable (short 30 For proof, see Rea 2000 : 296 or Rea 2002 Or, if there is no such proposition, then at least this much follows: necessarily, for any true proposition that approximates telling the whole truth about the world, there is a rational community that accepts it. 32 Here are the steps: Let W be a world with no contingently existing rational beings and let E 1 -E n be the members of the rational community that exists in W. We then have:
(1) •~P ⇒ ~P [provable in the S5 modal system]
